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Introduction 
 
Nell and Errouaki state that their intent is to reformulate econometrics along more realistic 
lines. In so doing they also explicitly acknowledge a debt to realist debates in methodology, 
notably in relation to the construction of argument regarding the nature of science, objectivity 
and laws in Chapter 4 (Nell and Errouaki, 2013: xii). This requires some context, since 
seeking to be more realistic and accepting the tenets of realism are not necessarily the same. 
One is theory and application, and the other is argument regarding the grounds of theory and 
application. Moreover, the status of econometrics in relation to realism is not an 
uncontroversial subject. Nell and Errouaki’s work is worth careful consideration because its 
themes are so little considered within econometrics, despite their relevance for the role and 
realisticness of econometrics. The vast majority of work on econometrics concerns problems 
of method only – the technical limits of methods and resolutions to technical problems – very 
little of it concerns how (and whether) an econometric inquiry should be structured and 
pursued in order to be adequate.    
 
 
Placing Nell and Errouaki in context: realism and mathematics 
 
The realist critique in economics centred in particular on the Cambridge Social Ontology 
Group (CSOG) focuses on the problems of closed system theory and method. The core of the 
argument is that any theory or method that presupposes or seeks forms of regularity (a 
whenever x then y) in events provides an overly limited account of an economy. Since social 
reality is a historically complex set of inter-relations that are in process and subject to 
cumulative (and hence qualitatively shifting) causation, any theory or method that 
presupposes or seeks forms of regularity will over time fail as an explanatory endeavour 
(since relative stability is not regularity per se and stability breaks down). The implication is 
that the overwhelming promotion and then (in the face of observed periodic failures) 
preservation of such theory and method perpetuates a misspecified basis for economics. 
Perpetuation is then also an impediment to the development of economics, since the 
preservation of problematic forms will tend to undermine innovation that occurs from within 
this misspecification.  
 
Tony Lawson, as the most prominent member of CSOG, has been careful to state that he is 
not opposed to mathematics: 
 
I hope by now the highly conditional nature of my criticism is apparent. It is 
not, and has never been, my intention to oppose the use of formalistic 
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methods in themselves. My primary opposition, rather, is to the manner in 
which they are everywhere imposed, to the insistence on their being almost 
universally wielded, irrespective of, and prior to, considerations of explanatory 
relevance, and in the face of repeated failures. (Lawson, 2003: xix) 
 
However, despite such statements the core argument has created some controversy within 
heterodox economics regarding the use of mathematics in general and econometrics in 
particular. Lawson’s critique is oriented primarily on today’s mainstream. The claim is that the 
problem of closed systems, regularity-focused, varieties of theory and method are central 
aspects of today’s mainstream economics. Since the critique is initially oriented on the current 
mainstream the ready inference is that typical modes of expression and application in the 
mainstream are, caveats not withstanding, necessarily problematic:  notably the statement of 
theory along formal lines and the building of models and applications based on analytical 
statistics. The contrasting inference is that heterodox economics is different than the 
mainstream. A well-known essay by Lawson, which claims an underlying unity of heterodox 
economics based on varieties of open system theorisation, emphasises this difference from 
the mainstream (2006). The idea of a contrast with the mainstream lends itself also to the 
inference that the most effective expressions of the open system unity in heterodox 
economics eschew formalism and resists a default to unthinking uses of econometric 
applications. A recent essay by Lawson seeking to rehabilitate Veblen’s original concept of 
neoclassical economics based on the problem of a mismatch between social ontology and 
method (whereby some heterodox economists inadvertently become neoclassical), has 
served to encourage this sense that CSOG advocate a heterodox economics that is more 
than mathematical-quantitative  (Lawson, 2013). However, quite what this means, is itself a 
matter of some controversy. CSOG in general and Lawson’s work in particular has acquired a 
reputation as not just advocating more than mathematics, but rather as anti-mathematics, 
despite Lawson’s statements to the contrary (see, for example, Mohun and Veneziani, 2012).  
 
There are, however, attempts to sympathetically reconsider the role of mathematics in 
economics that attempt to absorb some of the claims of CSOG, and these create a challenge 
to the general perception of the work on social ontology. Velupillai’s work is of this kind (2007, 
2010). Velupillai argues that we have been conned by increasing mathematical complexity 
into ignoring that the mathematics is often ill-used because of the: 
 
cons that are replete in a kind of mathematical economics that relies on them 
for formalizations, theorizing and inferences. Reliance on them leads to 
whimsical assumptions, entirely determined and dictated by the mathematics 
and not by the ontology of economic entities, institutions and behaviour. As a 
consequence the inferences are inherently fragile or even senseless, since 
they require impossible approximations from uncomputable entities and 
undecidable propositions. (Velupillai, 2007: p. 468) 
  
The belief in the power and necessity of formalizing economic theory 
mathematically has thus obliterated the distinction between cognitively 
perceiving and understanding concepts from different domains and mapping 
them into each other. Whether the age-old problem of the equality between 
supply and demand should be mathematically formalized as a system of 
inequalities or equalities is not something that should be decided by 
mathematical knowledge or convenience. Surely it would be considered 
absurd, bordering on the insane, if a surgical procedure was implemented 
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because a tool for its implementation was devised by a medical doctor who 
knew and believed in topological fixed- point theorems? Yet, weighty 
propositions about policy are decided on the basis of formalizations based on 
ignorance and belief in the veracity of one kind of one-dimensional 
mathematics. (Velupillai, 2007: p. 488) 
 
Velupillai brings the fundamental issue back to a basic problem expressed in the philosophy 
of mathematics, the split between arbitrary mathematical systems and actually constructible 
ones. He then seeks to rebuild economics based on what can actually be constructed. Given 
an economic system is recognizably complex and shifting, the mathematics is then 
necessarily addressed to complexity, rooted in Velupillai’s case in computability (2010). 
 
Velupillai explicitly states a debt to Lawson in his thinking on the nature of how an economy 
works. Post-Keynesians in particular are long-term advocates of non-linear mathematical 
approaches to modelling an economic system (for example, Steve Keen, 2013; or Mark 
Setterfield, 2000). In addition to ensuring money is actually incorporated into theory, Post-
Keynesians tend to model economies as subject to endogeneity, and as complex, fluctuating 
processes, subject to instability and degrees of uncertainty, rather than cycles, 
(dis)equilibrium and definite paths. This requires a rather different approach to mathematics 
than has dominated the mainstream (see also Fullbrook, 2013, 2015), but one that embraces 
the basic insight that an economy is an open system, irrespective of any ambivalence 
regarding how Lawson’s work is also perceived and sometimes misperceived (see Morgan, 
2012). 
 
 
Nell and Errouaki’s core claim and its significance  
 
Nell and Errouaki’s latest work Rational Econometric Man takes a slightly different approach 
to open systems and complexity, albeit one that is also indebted to Keynes and Post-
Keynesianism. Nell and Errouaki argue that economies are open systems but that there are in 
fact, because of the nature of social reality, actual quasi-regularities that econometrics can 
capture. However, these are radically different in origin than modern econometrics supposes. 
They are not a product of individuated rational (bounded or otherwise) agents, where agents 
can be persons, firms, households etc., and where such agents are always subject to 
methodological individualism. Rather they are a product of time sensitive institutions that 
provide for a degree of stability in behaviour. It is the interplay between agent’s behaviour and 
the structured situations in which they are able to act that result in either the reproduction of 
the grounds of the interaction or their transformation. Moreover, some grounds tend to be 
more enduring and some more volatile, so not all aspects of the economic system can be 
considered quasi-regular even during periods of stability. There is, therefore, a difference 
between what is regular within stability and the manifestation in events of stability.  
 
The central claim remains that regularity provides a reliable focus for econometric 
investigation, despite that one must be able to distinguish between what is regular within the 
economy and any current degree of stability in that system. The critique of contemporary 
econometrics lack of both realisticness and realism requires a profound change in how 
econometrics is perceived and pursued. If regularity occurs within an open system, based on 
agency-structure and institutions, then realisticness requires that one must do more than 
identify and test regularity, one must do so in a way that reciprocates with theory, since the 
grounds of “regularity” can shift. As such, one cannot simply introduce theory as a mere set of 
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unrealistic assumptions that underpin econometrics, nor can one simply dispense with formal 
theory and its testing or consideration as an aspect of econometrics. One must rather build 
research programmes that shift back and forth between theory formation and econometrics 
based on adequate data processing. There is here some degree of crossover with the intent 
of Hendry, the most innovative of econometricians to consider the problem of methodology. 
According to Hendry: 
 
The problems of econometrics are many and varied. The economy is a 
complicated, dynamic, non-linear, high-dimensional, and evolving entity. So 
studying it will be difficult. Society and its social system both alter over time, 
laws change and technological innovations occur, so establishing invariants 
of the system will not be easy… ‘Theory driven’ approaches in which a model 
is derived from a priori theory and calibrated from data evidence, lie at one 
extreme. These suffer from theory dependence in that their credibility 
depends on the credibility of the theory from which they arose – when the 
theory is discarded so is the associated evidence… ‘Data driven’ approaches, 
where models are developed to closely describe the data, lie at the other 
extreme. These suffer from sample dependence in that accidental and 
transient data features are embodied as tightly in the model as permanent 
aspects, so that extensions of the data set often reveal predictive failure. An 
interactive blend of theory and evidence naturally suggests itself. (Hendry, 
1995: p. 6)  
 
It should be noted that there are significant differences regarding the concept of realism 
between Hendry and Cambridge Realists (see, Pratten, 2005)1 and Nell and Errouaki do not 
actually address these to any degree (However, see Nell and Errouaki, 2013: p. 236).  They 
recognize Hendry is concerned with similar issues to themselves but go back to the origins of 
econometrics for their initial inspiration.  
 
 
The substance of the argument 
 
Nell ought to be familiar to anyone with an interest in economic methodology, as the co-
author with Martin Hollis of the classic Rational Economic Man (1975) and as an economic 
theorist with longstanding interests in growth theory (transformational growth), monetary 
economics and institutions. As noted Nell and Errouaki acknowledge an explicit debt to the 
CSOG position on social ontology (Nell and Errouaki, 2013: xii). However, in terms of the 
                                                     
1 Hendry is notably more assertive regarding the centrality of econometrics of economics, and also 
differs over the justification if it. For example: Empirical econometric models are systems of quantitative 
relationships linking observed data series. They have four main roles in economics. First, they are data 
summaries: there exist too many variables of potential interest in economics for us to investigate them 
all, so summarization is essential. And econometric models are one way. Secondly, econometric models 
allow us to interpret empirical evidence: facts rarely speak for themselves, and a well-defined 
framework, such as an econometric model, will prove invaluable. Thirdly, there are often several 
competing theoretical explanations for economic phenomena: econometric models play an important 
role in evaluating the relevant explanatory powers of these theories. Finally, econometric models are the 
primary vehicle for the accumulation and consolidation of empirical knowledge about how economies 
function. In the long run, this may be their main raison d’etre. Since econometrics is essentially empirical 
in nature, it offers a potentially scientific approach to understanding human conduct, and is the major 
source of systematic information about economic behaviour… However it must be stressed that the 
economy is too large and complicated for us to develop ‘true’ models of it. Rather empirical models are 
invariably simplifications and, in that sense, invariably false… Consequently, we must develop other 
criteria than truth to judge empirical models and select between them. (Hendry, 1995: p. 4) 
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econometrics, Rational Econometric Man (2013) takes as its point of departure the original 
intentions of the New School International Seminar in Econometrics, which ran in the early 
1940s (or Cowles approach, named for the Cowles Commission for Research in Economics, 
which followed it beginning in 1943). The focus begins from the work of Haavelmo and 
encompasses the subsequent work of Lawrence Klein and others. Nell and Errouaki cite Mary 
Morgan for the original intent and orientation: 
 
Econometrics was regarded by its first practitioners as a creative synthesis of 
theory and evidence, with which almost anything and everything could, it 
seems, be achieved: new economic laws might be discovered and new 
economic theories developed, as well as old laws measured and existing 
theories put to rest. This optimism was based on an extraordinary faith in 
quantitative techniques and the belief that econometrics bore the hallmarks of 
a genuinely scientific form of applied economics. In the first place, the 
econometric approach was not primarily an empirical one: econometricians 
firmly believed that economic theory played an essential part in finding out 
about the world. But to see how the world really worked, theory had to be 
applied; and their statistical evidence boasted all the right scientific 
credentials: the data were numerous, numerical and as near as possible 
objective. Finally, econometricians depended on an analytical method based 
on the latest advances in statistical techniques. (cited Nell and Errouaki, 
2013: 61)      
 
As both Nell and Errouaki and Hendry note this early potential gave way to a degree of 
cynicism and shift in how econometrics was positioned and pursued. For Hendry a great deal 
of econometrics simply became a simulation of scientific inquiry, a form of “Alchemy” (1993). 
 
According to Nell and Errouaki, “the problems of econometrics may lie not so much in 
econometrics itself as in the unrealistic approach to economic theory on which it has drawn to 
specify its functions.” (Nell and Errouaki, 2013: 41). The core problem they identify is the 
neoclassical rational economic agent and its constrained variants and also its many 
expressions via equivalent terms for the agent such as the household, the firm etc. This 
economic agent cannot be constructed consistently based on deduction and cannot be 
derived from induction since actual agents lack the properties of the economic agent; the 
agent is an idealisation not an abstraction. The problem is one within the “DNA” of 
neoclassical (by which the authors mean core mainstream) economics. It “also undermines 
methodological individualism; if behaviour cannot be reliably predicted on the basis of the 
‘rational choices of agents’, a social order cannot reliably follow from the choices of agents… 
What is needed to rebuild econometrics is realism in theory” (Nell and Errouaki, 2013: 30-31). 
Without this realism in theory, the link between adequate theory and data and data and 
adequate theory is broken. This is compounded by a problem of data:  
 
The econometric model builder is rarely involved directly with the data 
collection and refinement, and often has to use published data knowing very 
little about their origins. This lack of knowledge can have serious 
repercussions on the modelling process and lead to misleading conclusions. 
Ignorance related to how the data were collected can lead to an erroneous 
choice of an appropriate sampling model. Moreover, if the choice of data is 
based only on the name they carry and not on intimate knowledge about what 
exactly they are measuring, it can lead to an inappropriate choice of the 
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statistical generating mechanism and some misleading conclusions about the 
relationship between the estimated econometric model and the theoretical 
model as suggested by economic theory.  (Nell and Errouaki, 2013:  42) 
 
Since the recognized problems for Nell and Errouaki are unrealistic theory construction and 
irresponsible use of data then the solution that follows is to construct theory that is realistic 
(can approximate social order and its characteristics) and to ensure better data and better use 
of data. More specifically the solution begins from methodological institutionalism. The 
economic agent exists in a set of institutions and behaviour is conditioned in and through 
these institutions (there are structures and there are socialised agents). Institutions are 
historic and thus transient. At the same time institutions create relatively stable conditions for 
economic activity, so for some period they are a source of relatively recurring behaviour (they 
are objective conditions even if they are rules and concepts rather than material bodies). 
These institutions are corrigible so the specification of them is also a research question, one 
does not simply assume and impose them. Fieldwork is thus necessary and intrinsic to theory 
specification, iteration and respecification, and so there is a reciprocal relationship between 
well-conceived empirical research, adequate data collection and theory formation.  There is a 
very clear contrast here with much of contemporary modelling and econometrics: 
 
Neoclassical models analyse behaviour in specific ways. Instead of drawing 
on fieldwork, to define motivation and set the problems of choice in well-
described institutional context, agents are considered abstractly and 
presumed to be rational and choose freely. This, then, leads to models that 
exhibit a particular kind of market behaviour, which we can call a ‘stimulus-
response’ pattern… It is assumed that actions in response to stimuli are 
successful… Given the behavioural assumptions, reaction patterns to such 
hypothetical stimuli are constructed, and from these sets market functions are 
aggregated. Equilibrium market positions are then determined by solving the 
market equation on the hypothesis that behaviour will be adjusted as stimuli 
move, until the markets are cleared… But the stimulus-response approach is 
appropriate only for describing agents who are understood as having given 
motivations and values. The agents must also be understood as having given 
knowledge of the world; they do not learn or innovate [in neoclassical models 
they are passive in a fixed world. By contrast one must establish more 
realistically behaving agents and a more realistic world – its structures] actual 
or observable agents are rarely similar to the types postulated by the model… 
Structural models show how the economy maintains and reproduces itself. 
But it will not do so in exactly the same way every time – agents with active 
minds will see to that. Market adjustment will confront agents with 
characteristic problems [but] the system evolves. (Nell and Errouaki, 2013: 
383-384)   
 
For Nell and Errouaki economics can become a better science if it explores and represents 
the actual characteristics of its object of study more appropriately. They claim social reality is 
geographically and historically bounded and so laws cannot be of the kind found in physics 
though perhaps they may overlap with biology. Moreover, some aspects of behaviour are 
simply volatile and so subject to uncertainty in Keynes’ and Knight’s primary sense. However, 
they also claim, following Klein, that the conditions of social reality are sufficiently fixed for 
law-like relations to hold in given places and times. Institutions give a degree of fixedness to 
reality and this justifies structural approaches to econometric modelling. One can explore the 
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whole in a way expressible as, modifying an approach developed by Bonnafous, a 
“methodological triangle circle” or MTC: (Nell and Errouaki, 2013: p. 152-154 and 171). The 
idea is to operationally unify coherent theory, measurement (quantification) and applications 
of theory (relevance).   
 
Nell and Errouaki are candid in respect of this MTC. As a methodological statement in the 
context of the idea of social science quasi-laws for economics MTC seems manifestly 
superior to the many contradictions and failings of modern econometrics, which are, in the 
ordinary scheme of things simply passed over. However, Rational Econometric Man is not 
just a sophisticated work of methodological critique that seeks to state an alternative as an 
unproblematic general solution, simply because the alternative differs from the work it 
critiques. Nell and Errouaki recognize and seek to address key problems of the inter-relation 
between theory, measurement and application. For example:    
 
There is absolutely no reason that relationships of statistical reality should be 
linear; furthermore one notes that economic reality is often incompatible, 
even as an approximation, with the mathematical tool (be it linear or non-
linear)… [And] The measurement of model parameters from statistical 
samples requires the use of estimating techniques that were developed within 
the theory of probability and are based on specific probabilistic hypotheses 
(normal distributions of residual terms, independence of random variables, 
etc.)… There is no particular reason for these hypotheses to match a 
statistical reality. (Nell and Errouaki, 2013: pp. 178-180)  
 
For Nell and Errouaki, though there is no reason that relationships must be linear, it does not 
mean that they cannot approximate linearity for some period in some ways. More generally in 
terms of the justification and more specifically in terms of a focus on economics Nell and 
Errouaki claim that it is good fieldwork that brings together the MTC and it does so on the 
basis of different ways one can specify key components of an historically recognizable 
economy: 
 
The ‘economy’ we argue, implies a market system of some sort. By saying 
that in a particular society ‘an economy exists’, we mean that the regular 
reproduction of the structure of that society is carried out by a market system; 
the society continues to exist because of activities carried out under market 
incentives. By a market system we mean that there are relations of 
Ownership, o relations, and these are expressed in terms of value, v 
relations. (Nell and Errouaki, 2013: p. 125)  
 
The o and v relations are directly related to the MTC diagram: v relations 
ensure measurement and o relations ensure applicability… Fieldwork done 
properly will reveal o and v relationships, as well as other ones, and this will 
tend to ensure relevance… Fieldwork will enable us to take in and 
understand the concepts that guide social and economic practices; 
conceptual analysis will develop them into theories. (Nell and Errouaki, 2013: 
p. 183). 
 
Here fieldwork allows one to come to know or be familiar with the concepts, norms and rules, 
which guide economic activity. Econometrics becomes a way to estimate the parameters of 
law-like relationships created by an economy founded in and reproducing ownership and 
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value. The way the whole is set up here seems to lead easily to a focus on Nell’s own 
longstanding interests in economic theory, which broadly straddle Post-Keynesian and 
institutional concerns. Chapter 11 provides a number of illustrations of MTC as the basis for a 
considered use of econometrics in relation to open systems. For example, the relationship 
between unemployment and inflation. In chapter 11 they briefly set out how fieldwork 
undermines the neoclassical claim that unemployment is voluntary and inflation is caused by 
excess money. Any investigation of real structures, rules and institutions leads to the 
conclusion that actual economic activity is structured, conditioned and institutionalised in 
ways that allow for involuntary and structural unemployment and where inflation does not 
arise simply because of more or less money in the system. For example, ownership and 
investment matter in particular ways based on convention and law. At the same time, one can 
make use of well-understood relationships to use econometrics in pursuit of better concepts 
and as support for more adequate theory. Recalling that “the problems of econometrics may 
lie not so much in econometrics itself as in the unrealistic approach to economic theory on 
which it has drawn to specify its functions” (Nell and Errouaki, 2013: 41) they state:   
 
Mainstream economics has not done a good job with inflation… The problem 
of the large econometric models in the 1970s were less in estimating than in 
specifying relationships and model structure, particularly the relationships 
between the real and financial aspects of the economy… This was 
particularly true of production; fixed coefficient models held up well, but 
neoclassical marginal productivity models turned out to be deeply flawed – 
they purported to estimate production but actually captured cost identities. 
Yet the estimations of many particular relationships proved sound; parts of 
the models held up throughout. These were the reliable functions – 
household consumption spending in various categories of goods and 
services, labour productivity in the different sectors, import propensities, 
multiplier relationships – all of which generally came through ok. In these 
functions the ‘targets’ are well-defined – we know what the process is aiming 
at or trying to achieve – so there are good reasons to expect certain mean 
values. And the forces or pressures that bring about ‘misses’ are also well 
understood; we know what gets in the way of achieving the targets, or causes 
deviations. (Nell and Errouaki, 2013: p. 406)  
 
For Nell and Errouaki the implication is that one can, within the MTC recontextualise the 
relationships and specify different kinds of models rooted in better theory that accords more 
with experienced reality of how economic activity is structured and how agents really behave. 
Chapter 11 also uses Nell’s work on transformational growth to illustrate how econometrics 
can be part of an historical open systems account of periodisation:   
 
We suggest that econometrics and macroeconometric model building should 
be more sensitive to large-scale changes in the characteristic patterns of 
data. For example, it is well-known that in the nineteenth century fluctuations 
show up more prominently in price data than in employment or output series, 
whereas in the twentieth century the reverse is true, particularly after World 
War II. Accordingly, transformational growth contrasts two general ‘models of 
adjustment’ of capitalist societies. These are both macro models, and are 
both based on reliable relationships – firms selling in competitive conditions, 
households spending to support themselves. Each model is abstract and 
quite general, but nothing is ‘idealised’. Each is presented ‘mathematically’, 
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although the functions are abstract and aggregate, so that fitting data to them 
would require careful attention to the definitions of the variables. But it is 
argued that functions correctly represent directions of variation, and rough 
relative orders of magnitude, and that each represents the working of the 
system during a particular historical period.  (Nell and Errouaki, 2013: p 431) 
 
Ultimately: 
 
Econometrics is about economics; it proposes using measurement to amplify, 
develop and test explanations, and with it, our understanding of the structure 
of the economy and how it works; it is not about forecasting, or about reliable 
statistical relationships that lack economic content. Econometrics provides 
numerical content to economics, making it possible to test and amplify 
economic theory by directly applying it empirically. It rests on three pillars: 
theory-coherence, applicability-relevance, and measurement-quantification… 
The ambitions of the early econometricians were not wrong [testing theory etc 
but]. They thought that conventional economic theory was largely sound, and 
that their job was to fill in the numbers in the relationships that theory 
proposed. They were wrong; much theory has been misleading, and much 
has simply been irrelevant – having no application. But the economy is a 
system, a social system, and it keeps itself in existence by engaging in a 
pattern of production, distribution, consumption and exchange, regulated by 
ownership rights and value transactions. Once we understand this, we can 
see our way to uncovering and defining the relationships involved, and this 
will give us a foundation on which to build. We can do econometrics – not 
exactly the way the founders wanted, but well enough to provide a testing 
ground for our theories. (Nell and Errouaki, 2013: p. 477) 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Rational Econometric Man is an important book regarding an under-discussed subject. 
Econometrics has become ubiquitous in economics, yet fundamental arguments regarding 
what it can achieve and how it ought to be positioned remain rare. This is partly because any 
such fundamental discussion cannot avoid acknowledging the deep problems the field has 
accumulated. It is far safer to simply focus on technical issues of given models and methods 
and then make bland statements regarding dilemmas of observational equivalence and 
undecidability. Nell and Errouaki take a different path. They combine sophisticated 
methodological critique and analysis with a clear central argument. Econometrics can 
contribute to a more realistic economics. The project is more than mathematical but is about 
the constructive use of mathematics and statistics. The innovative approach to 
methodological institutionalism flows directly from Vellupillai’s concern to reverse the way 
“whimsical assumptions, entirely determined and dictated by the mathematics and not by the 
ontology of economic entities, institutions and behaviour” (Velupillai, 2007: p. 468) have 
dominated the use of mathematics. It is, as such, a significant contribution to applied realist 
methodology.       
 
However, though Rational Econometric Man is an important work it does provoke a range of 
further considerations. Though the work is about more than mathematics it does still proceed 
as though mathematics is the most appropriate way in which an economic argument can be 
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expressed, and an empirical economic investigation can be constructed and used to “test” 
and develop theory. This is mainly assumed rather than argued for, because economics is a 
science. More could have been said about why economics ought to be mathematical. 
Moreover, though the argument made does not reduce to a demonstration or confirmation of 
Nell’s work on economic theory, since the claims are broader, the illustrations tend to convey 
the impression that it is in terms of Nell’s work on theory that regular relations within the 
econometrics can be made sense of. Given the MTC is about the relation between theory, 
investigation and data, where all are subject to modification, a sceptic might wonder that the 
actual illustrations often read like confirmations. It would be unfair to make too much of this 
since the problem would be difficult to avoid, given that Nell has a lifetime’s worth of well 
received economic theory to draw on, and that theory is so clearly within an open systems 
framework of the kind any appropriate use of econometrics is liable to be referenced to. Still, 
one could perhaps construct a variety of counter-arguments regarding theory confirmation 
based on different open systems interpretations because of the recognized problem that 
“although the functions are abstract and aggregate, so that fitting data to them would require 
careful attention to the definitions of the variables” (Nell and Errouaki, 2013: p 431). Given the 
point of reference would be econometrics within open systems this would still be progress.        
 
However, the use of econometrics as that point of reference may also invite further questions 
regarding the status of econometrics. Nell and Errouaki’s argument is that econometrics has 
radically misconceived the source of relative regularity within an economic system. It cannot 
follow from methodological individualism and individuated agents, but rather is a 
consequence of structured activity expressible in methodological institutionalism. This way of 
looking at historical systems seems to directly address the social ontology critique that any 
theory or method that seeks or presupposes regularity will over time fail as an explanatory 
endeavour, since the very basis of methodological institutionalism is to time-constrain 
regularity. Nevertheless, the focus remains regularity and there may be some slippage of 
usage of the term here.  
 
Nell and Errouaki state that “there are good reasons to expect certain mean values” (Nell and 
Errouaki, 2013: p. 406). In the end the argument is about a different use of econometrics 
rather than a different econometrics. The focus remains essentially one where probabilistic 
relations can meaningfully represent key aspects of social reality, within an economy. This 
may be so, but two points then follow. First, the MTC is unified by good fieldwork. In the end it 
is the degree to which the economist is immersed in and appropriately familiar with the 
empirical aspects of an economy that dictate their capacity to develop (as well as be guided 
by) good concepts and theory. Econometrics is not itself liable to result in this immersion in 
the empirical aspects of the economy. It is a form of “test”. Yet the broader contextualising 
test is less rigorous and more qualitative, if not necessarily intuitive. It is the openness to and 
feel for many kinds of data, processed in a variety of ways. The significant difference between 
neoclassical economics and open system approaches is not just based on the rejection of 
idealised unrealistic assumptions – it is in the commitment to start from the reality of how an 
economy is and to accommodate theory to that reality (without reducing this to an empiricist 
fallacy). The implication is that multiple methods are important rather than many data sources 
that feed into econometric modelling only. Nell and Errouaki could perhaps have emphasised 
this more – since it is not antithetical to their argument and is consistent with their approach to 
fieldwork.   
Second, the overall discussion of econometrics may still leave the status and reality of a 
stochastic regularity contestable, if not ambiguous in relation to methodological 
institutionalism. In econometrics the quantification of the relationship is synthetic; it is an 
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expression of an averaging effect not an intrinsic component or shaper of the activity. Its role 
in law like behaviour is then also potentially contestable, since no one is acting from or 
following the average (it is not part of agents reasons for acting) and the average is not part of 
the institutional conditions that structure or contextualise economic activity (it is not creating a 
downward causation). Clearly, Nell and Errouaki are aware of this, since the argument for o 
and v relations notes also that social reality including an economy is based on the powers or 
capacities of significant entities (and it is this that defines something as real, for example, Nell 
and Errouaki, 2013: p. 430). However, given that powers or capacities of significant entities 
result in tendencies to act in given ways, regularity, even stochastically expressed regularity, 
is different than the existence of, and expression of, a power. So from a methodological point 
of view there may be more to say here in order to adequately clarify and justify the status of 
econometrics as a form of realism and as a contribution to more realistic economics. This is 
by no means to denigrate this excellent work and its achievements, it is simply to note there is 
still more to say and do, since the work is not just a claim that “this way works,” it is a 
methodological exploration of how we conceptualise and argue for what works. In any case, I 
would urge anyone with an interest in econometrics to read this book and so better 
understand what it is that they are doing and what it is that they could do.          
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